However, as strong as the S35 design was, there were many-a-wrinkle that dampened its battlefield reach. One key limitation was in the use of a one-man turret. This forced the commander - residing in the turret - to manage his commanding duties, loading and firing of the main gun and machine gun while receiving and reacting to messages from the radio operator all the while keeping a watchful eye on the unfolding tactical situation around his vehicle and of that near his platoon as a whole. As such, full efficiency of S35 units were ever rarely reached in the heat of battle. The profile of the S35 was also rather tall which made it a most tempting target to anti-tank crews or enemy tank gunners. While the use of casting in the hull's construction was innovative, the decision to manufacture these as two major halves joined by a ring of bolts ensured that the hull would split at the seams after a specially-placed direct hit. The shortage of radios limited the tactical scope of an S35 platoon and French armored doctrine of the time concentrated armored forces into small reactionary groups along a scattered front which led to unfavorable results for French forces during the Battle of France. The S35 was also a complicated and expensive beast to manufacture meaning that only a few could be produced in a given amount of time. To add insult to injury, labor strife at home ultimately limited production of S35 tanks in the short-term. The complexity of the suspension system proved unreliable in the long run and required high levels of maintenance which were unacceptable for a fighting machine. Add to all this the general inexperience of French tanker crews and leaders and one begins to understand the inherent limitations in the French defense.
In practice, the S35 outclassed the German Panzer III offering in armor, firepower and mobility. The German design bested the S35 in tactics and overall powertrain reliability which proved greater than the qualities of the French system. Despite this, the S35 formed a very real threat to German expansion into French territory and were justly dealt with through concerted armor drives and direct dive-bombing attacks when possible. Internal issues and the advent of German Blitzkrieg tactics ultimately limited production and delivery to frontline forces and restricted the legacy of what was a very fine tank of the 1930s. Only 430 of the type were produced in all. There proved a late attempt to fit a 220 horsepower engine into the S35 series as well as improved various facets of the design as the "SOMUA S40" though this yielded no suitable production numbers. Another initiative produced the 75mm-armed S35 (as the SAu 40) self-propelled gun in prototype form which would have been helpful in the defense of France but the German invasion put an end to these promising developments and any intended subsequent production. There were 72 SAu 40 SPGs slated for production. A 1945 initiative intended to fit the excellent British 17-pdr (76.2mm) anti-tank gun to the S35 but this fell to naught.
In 1944, when the Allies pushed their way through France, S35 tanks that were recovered intact were delivered to awaiting Free French forces who continued their use against pockets of German resistance. While still a relatively effective fighting machine to a certain extent, the S35 was eventually outclassed by better armed and armored combat tanks appearing in greater numbers. The American M4 Sherman proliferated the inventories of the Allies to a high degree and many capable variants arose to counter German advances. The 47mm main gun of the S35 was eventually limited by 1944 standards but could still serve a purpose against lesser armor or dug-in foes. Even the German Army listed a dozen functional S35 tanks in December of 1944. There was some noted Japanese interest in the captured S35 production lines leading up to 1942. However, no production examples were ever delivered to the Empire of Japan for use in the Pacific Theater.
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